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Reflections on the Pros and Cons of State Regulation*
JOSEPH L. PORKET**
Independent scholar**
Abstract: Societies need regulation of human behaviour and human social interaction
if they want to maintain a system of ordered relationships and, thus, to survive and
prosper. Inevitably, it raises the question of who regulates what, when, how, and why
on the basis of what title, at what costs, and with what consequences. In modern soci-
eties, which are complex systems, an important role is played by state regulation, which
may be more or less permissive or restrictive. In any case, it is a source of tensions and
conflicts in society. Yet, permissive state regulation is preferable to restrictive. The rea-
son is that by encouraging spontaneity, i.e. individual freedom and self-regulation, al-
beit within a stable framework of general ex ante rules, it positively contributes to pros-
perity and development and reduces non-compliance with government-made formal
rules, such as second economy activity.
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Regulation of human behaviour and human social interaction is a universal feature of so-
cieties, whether traditional or modern. In the latter, on account of their size and complex
role and subsystem differentiation, it inevitably takes place at different levels, albeit with-
in the framework of state regulation. Consequently, these societies are characterised by a
web of formal as well as informal regulation and self-regulation, by a plurality of regulato-
ry systems. And this plurality of regulatory systems is an important source of tensions and
conflicts in modern societies.
Currently, state regulation is a hot issue worldwide, both in theory and in practice.
After all, it implies a tension between individualism and collectivism, being about the
scope of political power and the role of the state in the economy and society, and hence
about the degree of autonomy (freedom) enjoyed by the members of society. And since the
world is undergoing rapid, wide-ranging, and pronounced change, this tension does not
simmer under the surface, but is highly visible in all societies, be they developed, develop-
ing, or post-communist.
Rules and commands
Societies have to regulate human behaviour and human social interaction in order to main-
tain a system of ordered relationships and, thus, to maximise the probability of their sur-
vival and the attainment of their material and non-material objectives in the conditions in
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which they find themselves. In brief, they need regulation if they want to avoid disorder
and disintegration and to survive and prosper.
Regulation is a process consisting of the making, application, and adjudication of
rules governing human behaviour and human social interaction. A rule is a norm which
prescribes or proscribes what a specified category of social actors should or should not do
on all occasions of a specified kind or on all occasions without qualification.1 Since pre-
scriptions and proscriptions are expected to be observed, the only alternative the ad-
dressees have is to break them. A wider choice exists when, instead of prescribing or pro-
scribing, rules express preferences or give permission. 
Rules must be distinguished from commands. In contrast to a rule which is a norm
applying to a general type of situation, a command is not a norm in this sense. It is an au-
thoritative order addressed to a particular social actor or a particular group of social ac-
tors and defining what the addressee(s) should or should not do on a particular occasion.
While in some cases it may be rule-based, in others it may break the existing rules, and in
still others it may be a substitute for non-existing rules.
To be effective, both rules and commands must be enforceable. Consequently, if it
were evident a priori that in practice a particular rule or command would be neither observed
nor enforceable, or that the costs of enforcement would be excessively high, it would be
politic to refrain from making or applying that rule or from giving that command.
Levels of regulation
Although the survival and prosperity of modern societies require state regulation, i.e. reg-
ulation which concerns the society as a whole, in these societies regulation is not confined
to state regulation. Within its framework, formal and/or informal regulation takes place in
various spatial social systems (such as subnational units, localities, neighbourhoods, and
households) as well as in various functional social systems (such as formal organisations,
informal groups, and families). Hence, different levels of regulation and self-regulation are
to be found in modern societies, which means that the state is not a monopoly rule-mak-
er and rule-enforcer.2
Since different levels of regulation and self-regulation are to be found in modern so-
cieties, the individual tends to be simultaneously subject to different and, not infrequent-
ly, conflicting regulatory systems, formal as well as informal. This is so because in most
cases the individual is simultaneously a member of a number of social systems, including
a family, various informal groups and formal organisations, a local community, and a so-
ciety, each of which has a regulatory system peculiar to it. At the same time, the regulato-
ry systems of face-to-face groups and small local communities may be more restrictive than
that of the state.
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1/ In the formulation of F. A. Hayek [1976, 14], ‘a rule refers to an unknown number of future in-
stances and to the acts of an unknown number of persons, and merely states certain attributes which
any such action ought to possess’.
2/ As put by Michael Laver [1997, 45], ‘even in societies dominated by a Leviathan, much day-to-day
social interaction is beyond the purview of the state and must perforce be governed along anarchis-
tic lines’. 
Regarding specifically the difference between regulation and self-regulation, a social
system is a self-regulating system if it can make, apply, and adjudicate the rules governing
the behaviour of and the interaction between its members, as well as its behaviour towards
and its interaction with its social environment. In contrast, a social system is not a self-reg-
ulating system if these rules are imposed on it and enforced from the outside by another
social actor. Thus, while in capitalist market economies private firms are self-regulating
systems, in socialist command economies state enterprises are regulated systems.
Naturally, there are degrees of regulation and self-regulation. Even in free-market
economies private firms’ self-regulation is constrained by the legal framework within
which they operate. Even societies are not completely self-regulating systems, because
state regulation tends to be constrained by international law, treaties, and conventions, as
well as by international organisations and transnational actors.
Types of rules
Irrespective of the level at which regulation and self-regulation take place within societies
and between them, several types of rules may be distinguished.3 The fundamental distinc-
tion is that between formal rules (such as statute laws, by-laws, and charters) and informal
rules (such as common law, customs, and conventions). The difference between them lies
in that the former are designed, enacted, and formally stated (i.e. made known in written
form), whereas the latter come into existence spontaneously, without being designed, en-
acted, and formally stated.
As the case of traditional societies and that of informal groups in modern societies
indicate, informal rules can be effective even in the absence of formal rules. In contrast,
formal rules do not put an end to informal rules, as evinced by the persistence in modern
societies of traditions, customs, and conventions, as well as by the occurrence in formal or-
ganisations of informal rules which support, supplement, obstruct, or supersede formal
rules.
Whether formal or informal, rules are either constitutive or regulative.4 The former
are concerned with the structure of the system and the acquisition and exercise of power
or influence, as well as with the system’s boundary and membership. If they did not exist,
there would be no systems and no institutions, the examples being the institution of prop-
erty and the institution of the market. The latter are then rules regulating those instances
of behaviour and interaction which are independent of them in the sense that they would
take place even without them, an example being the rules of the road.
Besides being either constitutive or regulative, formal and informal rules are either
permissive or restrictive concerning social actors’ behaviour and interaction, including
their goals and means. Although explicitly or implicitly both simultaneously prescribe
what social actors should do and proscribe what they should not do, permissive rules are
by their nature process-orientated and, hence, goal-independent, whereas restrictive rules
are by their nature goal-orientated and, hence, goal-dependent.
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3/ On the typology of rules see e.g. A. J. M. Milne [1988, 51-58] and Francis Fukuyama [2000].
4/ Douglass C. North speaks about constitutional rules and operating rules [1981, 203].
Since rules can be more or less permissive or restrictive, they may be located on a
continuum ranging from highly permissive (which confine themselves to defining broad
parameters within which social actors are free to make their own choices) to highly re-
strictive (which are highly specific as to both goals and means). The more permissive they
are, the higher the autonomy of social actors, and vice versa. The more restrictive they are,
the more they tend to shade into commands.
Not only rules, but regulatory systems, too, are more or less permissive or restrictive.
Since individuals tend to be simultaneously members of a number of social systems, they are
simultaneously subject to a number of regulatory systems, some more permissive, others
more restrictive. In this respect, the distinction between compulsory and voluntary mem-
bership is of importance: when their membership in a particular social system is compul-
sory, individuals have no choice but to be members, irrespective of how permissive or re-
strictive it is; in contrast, when their membership in a particular social system is voluntary,
their choice depends less on how permissive or restrictive it is and more on how it con-
tributes to the satisfaction of their needs and wants, to their survival and prosperity.
State regulation
Like regulatory systems in general, also the state as a regulatory system can be more or
less restrictive or permissive. How restrictive or permissive it is, depends on the extent and
intensity of state regulation. At the same time, the extent and intensity of state regulation
may vary from one sphere of human behaviour and human social interaction to another.
Thus, the extent and intensity of state regulation may be located on a continuum ranging
from highly restrictive in all spheres of human behaviour and human social interaction at
one extreme to highly permissive in all spheres of human behaviour and human social in-
teraction at the other.
When state regulation is highly restrictive in all spheres of human behaviour and hu-
man social interaction, the degree of autonomy (freedom) enjoyed by the members of so-
ciety is low and their dependence on the state high. In contrast, when state regulation is
highly permissive in all spheres of human behaviour and human social interaction, yet
keeps anarchy in the sense of a state of disorder at bay, the degree of autonomy (freedom)
enjoyed by the members of society is high, allowing self-assertion (the pursuit of self-in-
terest, choice), but also requiring self-reliance.
Irrespective of its extent and intensity, state regulation is a source of tensions and
conflicts in society, because while some members of society may favour the existing extent
and intensity of state regulation, others may favour its expansion either generally or in a
particular sphere, and still others may favour its contraction, again either generally or in a
particular sphere. For example, one British report distinguished five categories of voters.
Depending on their attitudes towards economic and personal freedom, voters consisted of
conservatives (who favoured economic freedom but wanted state regulation of personal
freedom, i.e. of individual choice in moral and social issues), socialists (who distrusted
economic freedom but favoured personal freedom), authoritarians (who favoured neither
economic nor personal freedom), libertarians (who favoured both economic and person-
al freedom), and centrists (who stood in the middle of the range on both economic and
personal freedom) [Blundell and Gosschalk 1997, David Smith 1997, 40].
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Going back to the differences in and consequences of the extent and intensity of
state regulation, permissive state regulation is conducive to the autonomy (freedom) of the
members of society and, hence, to self-regulation as well. Yet, per se it does not determine
whether and how social actors will use their autonomy (freedom): while on the one hand
they need not actually make full use of all the opportunities available to them, on the other
they may show lack of self-restraint and take undue advantage of others. And while it is
conducive to self-regulation, simultaneously it cannot dispense with it, albeit on condition
that self-regulation is constrained by conventions, customs, and traditions and does not en-
danger society’s cohesion and performance.
Restrictive state regulation, in contrast, circumscribes the autonomy (freedom) of
the members of society and, hence, also self-regulation. Being extensive and intensive, it
tends to have an adverse impact on flexibility, innovation, and efficiency; to increase the
costs connected with rule-making, rule-application, and rule-adjudication; and to lessen re-
spect for rules and contribute to covert and overt non-compliance on the part of the mem-
bers of society, one reason for non-compliance being compliance costs. Moreover, when
state regulation is extensive and intensive, rules are prone to be specific rather than gen-
eral, to suffer from inconsistencies, and to breed uncertainty because, besides often creat-
ing confusion, they have to be frequently modified or changed in response to both chang-
ing conditions and contingencies.
In sum, while permissive state regulation is a sign that the state is process-orientat-
ed, restrictive state regulation is a sign that the state is goal-orientated in the sense of be-
ing concerned with an end-state or final outcome. To use Giovanni Sartori’s terminology,
the former is characterised by the rule of law, whereas the latter is characterised by the rule
by laws, which nears, albeit in disguise, the rule by men [Sartori 1987]. Expressed differ-
ently, the latter is characterised by an incessant flow of ad hoc (discretionary) political and
bureaucratic decisions and ad hoc rules.
When state regulation is extensive and intensive and it becomes apparent that it nei-
ther works nor can work as expected, calls for deregulation are likely to materialise and
grow. Its purpose is to increase the autonomy (freedom) of the members of society by cur-
tailing government intervention in the economy and society. This requires reducing the ex-
isting amount of rules and/or changing the content of the existing rules, as well as putting
a check on ad hoc political and bureaucratic decisions. In brief, this requires substituting
general and abstract rules for specific and ad hoc rules or, in other words, process-orien-
tated (goal-independent) rules of conduct for goal-orientated (goal-dependent) rules.
Besides these measures, deregulation may need a revision of the established rules
governing rule-making. The need arises when the established rules governing rule-making
enable a proliferation of ad hoc rules, so that goal-driven governments are able arbitrarily
to enact ad hoc rules while nominally abiding by the established rules of rule-making.
Rule enforcement
Rules are expected to be observed, not broken. In the real world, though, they are not al-
ways observed, but often intentionally or unintentionally broken, sometimes even by the
rule-makers themselves. In modern societies, which are state societies, this applies to rules
at any level of regulation and, consequently, also to legal and bureaucratic rules.
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If rules are to be observed by their addressees, they must be enforced, and their en-
forcement is to be achieved by the use of both positive sanctions (and the promise there-
of) and negative sanctions (and the threat thereof). In other words, to encourage as well
as reward compliance with rules on the one hand and to deter as well as punish non-com-
pliance with rules on the other, rule-enforcement has to rely on a combination of physical,
material, and symbolic means.
Although rules must be enforced if they are to be observed, some are more flexible
(i.e. less rigorously applied and enforced) than others. Two main approaches to rule-en-
forcement may be distinguished, namely, the zero-tolerance approach (which punishes any
violation of rules, however slight) and the zone-of-indifference approach (which tolerates
minor violations of rules). The more extensive and intensive state regulation, the more
problematic is the zero-tolerance approach and the more necessary is the zone-of-indiffer-
ence approach.
Whether flexible or inflexible, rules may permit or require exceptions, exempting
certain social actors from compliance with them. According to Robert B. Edgerton, it is
possible to identify four general categories of rule exceptions: exceptions based on tempo-
rary conditions, such as temporary incapacity; exceptions arising from a specific status,
such as infancy, disability, or old age; exceptions connected with special occasions, such
as harvest or initiation rituals or funerals; and exceptions that apply only in certain set-
tings, such as sanctuaries [Edgerton 1985].
Since government-made rules must be enforced if they are to be observed, effective
rule-enforcement presupposes that rules are enforceable and that the government, besides
being determined to enforce them even in the face of opposition and resistance, has at its
disposal the requisite physical, material, and symbolic resources. At the same time, the less
compliance with rules is based on normative grounds (commitment), the greater the im-
portance of material and physical means in rule-enforcement. Yet, compliance based on
utilitarian (calculative, instrumental) grounds is more fragile than that based on commit-
ment, because it has a tendency to decline when the performance of the state declines,
when its ability to gratify and enforce falls.
Thus, rule-making and rule-enforcement incur costs, which have to be covered by the
revenue extracted by the state from the economy by means of taxation, direct and indirect.
Inevitably, the more extensive and intensive state regulation, i.e. the more formalised and
bureaucratised the economy and society, the more revenue the state needs and has to ex-
tract from the economy. In any case, revenue extraction incurs extraction costs, depends
on the state’s not unlimited extractive capabilities, and can give rise to tax avoidance
(which remains within the law), tax evasion (which breaks the law), and other forms of tax
resistance (such as delays in tax payment or tax revolts).
It follows that state regulation should take into consideration not only its expected
short-term and long-term as well as material and non-material benefits, but also its ex-
pected short-term and long-term as well as material and non-material costs, trying to max-
imise the former and minimise the latter. It follows, too, that tolerance of non-compliance
is likely to increase as the expected costs of rule-enforcement increase.
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Constraints on state regulation
The extent and intensity of state regulation depend on the orientation of government, on
whether it is process-orientated or goal-orientated in the sense of being concerned with an
end-state or final outcome. In any case, though, there are limits to effective state regula-
tion, so that the state is constrained in what it can do and attain.
Besides being constrained by the available resources and the costs of rule-making
and rule-enforcement, effective state regulation is further constrained by three major fac-
tors. The first is universally valid economic and other laws, which no state regulation can
put out of operation. The second is the existing political, economic, and civic structures:
if they are to be preserved, state regulation must not encroach on them. And the third is
the values of society: the more state regulation is at odds with the values of society, the
greater the likelihood of covert and overt non-compliance. Hence, there is an important
difference between effective state regulation and nominal state regulation. The difference
lies in that the former leads to compliance with the designed, enacted, and formally stat-
ed rules, whereas the latter does not. That is to say, while the former regulates human be-
haviour and human social interaction, the latter fails to do so.
Yet although it is easier to make rules than to enforce them, even rule-making faces
constraints. One of them is political constraints: by definition, rule-making is politically
less constrained in authoritarian political systems than in democratic ones, and in demo-
cratic ones it is politically less constrained in the case of one majority party government
than in the case of a coalition or a minority government.5
In democratic political systems, another constraint on rule-making is the constitu-
tion, which defines the parameters within which rule-making is to take place. In other
words, constitutional rules are designed to control, inter alia, the exercise of political pow-
er and, consequently, rule-making as well. For that reason, they are also intended to be
more costly to amend, modify, and replace than are operating rules.6 A further constraint
on rule-making in democratic political systems is judicial review, which means that courts
are explicitly or implicitly empowered to invalidate laws and administrative actions: while
in the case of constitutional review they rule on the constitutionality of laws and regula-
tions, in the case of administrative review they rule on the legality of administrative ac-
tions. Besides, in democratic political systems rule-making is affected by the demands and
activity of pressure groups7 and social movements,8 as well as by public opinion and the
mood of the time. They can block change in state regulation on the one hand and enforce
it on the other. Ultimately, the state may become a captive of narrow (special, sectional)
interests that either defend the status quo or press for change.
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5/ Some propositions concerning the impact of the electoral system and the type of government on
comprehensive public sector reforms and market-oriented reform policies can be found in Harrin-
virta [2000, 143-147].
6/ On flexible and rigid constitutions see Arend Lijphart [1999, 218-223].
7/ See e.g. J. L. Porket [1998, xvi-xvii, 36-37, 116-117 and 255].
8/ According to Robert O’Brien et al. [2000, 12], social movements are anti-systemic and rely on
mass mobilisation. However defined, though, they should be regarded as a subset of norm-setting
pressure groups.
Compliance and non-compliance
Although there are limits to effective state regulation, governments may become obsessed
with regulation. That is to say, they may develop a regulatory mentality, characterised by
a belief that they are the best judges of what is good for society and that, by means of reg-
ulation, they can solve any problem and attain any political, economic, social, and cultur-
al objective. The inevitable result of this belief in their omniscience and omnipotence is
then extensive and intensive state regulation.
Being inimical to spontaneity, extensive and intensive state regulation noticeably cir-
cumscribes the autonomy (freedom) of the members of society. At the same time, it gives
rise to uncertainty, because it has to be undergoing perpetual change. The reason is that
whenever the existing rules do not produce the officially desired outcomes, on principle
the remedy is sought either in their modification or in their replacement by new ones, not
in their relaxation or repeal.9
Whatever the extent and intensity of state regulation, it incurs costs which must be
covered by the revenue extracted by the state from the economy by means of taxation, di-
rect and indirect. In addition, though, state regulation can impose costs on the economy
by forcing economic actors (private firms in the first place) to take on certain duties, such
as to clean the environment, introduce particular safety measures, maintain specific prod-
uct standards, pay a minimum wage, provide benefits to employees, and collect taxes on
behalf of government.10
In any case, state regulation affects all spheres of human behaviour and human so-
cial interaction. In the economic sphere, for instance, it has an impact on productivity,
competitiveness, competition, profitability, hiring and firing, unemployment, prices, and
consumers’ choice. Outside the economic sphere, it has an impact on, inter alia, access to
information, communication, political activity and processes, marriage, divorce, provision
of health care and education, social inclusion and exclusion, individuals’ opportunities,
privileges, crime, and immigration.
For society, the impact of state regulation may be beneficial or harmful, depending
on its extent and intensity. In principle, state regulation is beneficial if it contributes to eco-
nomic, political, social, and cultural development by being process-orientated and, thus, al-
lowing spontaneity, albeit within the framework of general and abstract rules. In contrast,
state regulation is harmful if it retards economic, political, social, and cultural develop-
ment by being goal-orientated and, thus, putting fetters on spontaneity.
Yet, whether process-orientated or goal-orientated, state regulation is a source of ten-
sions and conflicts in society. They arise because the interests of the members of society
differ and because these interests determine attitudes towards the existing and the desired
extent and intensity of state regulation as well as towards compliance and non-compliance
with the existing rules. At the same time, the choice between compliance and non-compli-
ance is affected by the perception of their costs, which need not be exclusively economic.
By definition, goal-orientated state regulation is more conducive to covert and overt
non-compliance than process-orientated state regulation. The reason is that the former, be-
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9/ As to specifically command socialism see J. L. Porket [1989, 186].
10/ Some estimates of the costs imposed on business by government regulation in a variety of coun-
tries and contexts are quoted by Graham Bannock [2001, 2-4].
ing extensive and intensive, is likely not only to be detached from reality, but also to suf-
fer from inconsistencies, so that the observance of one rule precludes the observance of
another. As a result, in order to avoid paralysis, at least some of the rules applying to par-
ticular situations must be broken. This means that goal-orientated state regulation con-
tributes to the emergence and persistence of a culture of rule-breaking.
Pitfalls of state regulation
It follows from the foregoing that goal-orientated state regulation can fail to attain its ob-
jectives and/or produce unintended consequences. In other words, it can fail to solve ex-
isting problems, exacerbate them, and/or create new ones. Empirical evidence is not diffi-
cult to come by, as demonstrated by the selected cases presented below.
One example of the failure of state regulation is Prohibition in the United States. In
this liberal democracy, a considerable proportion of the population had always deplored
the use of alcohol. Under their pressure, the production, sale, and transport of alcohol
were outlawed between 1920 and 1933. However, the ban did not stop people drinking. It
merely drove them underground, i.e. to break the law, and gave rise to organised crime en-
gaged in smuggling, illicit distilling, and bootlegging. These activities, not surprisingly, in-
volved widespread corruption as well as the use of violence.11
Another example is the case of the communist systems established in the former
Soviet-bloc countries. As variants of totalist authoritarianism characterised by authoritari-
an politics and political control over the economy and society, they were highly formalised
and bureaucratized. Nevertheless, they had an informal dimension too, which was an un-
intended product of the formal system and deviated from it, in some respects comple-
menting it, in others eroding it. Among its elements was the second economy, brought
about by the bureaucratisation of the economy and chronic shortages affecting consumers
and state enterprises alike.
Illegal second economy activities were not confined to communist systems, though.
They are to be found in any established modern economic system, irrespective of its type.
In capitalist market economies, for instance, they have increased considerably since 1960,
their major causes being the tax burden, the complexity of the tax system, and restrictive
state regulation. They are also far from absent in the developing countries,12 as well as in
the post-communist ones.
The last example concerns contemporary Britain. Since the 1997 general election,
the Labour government has been obsessed with regulation. New regulatory measures have
imposed additional compliance costs on business, estimated to reach Ł15 billion by
January 2002 [Smith 2001].13 They have also imposed performance targets on the health
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11/ A less known case concerns off-course betting in Britain, which did not disappear between 1853
and 1961, although legally prohibited.
12/ In the developing world, according to some estimates, 50-75 per cent of all working people par-
ticipate in the second economy, the size of which amounts to between one-fifth and more than two-
thirds of the total economic output of the Third World. [Hernando de Soto 2000, 75]
13/ For estimates of the total additional cost to business, including tax increases, see Nicholas Boys
Smith [2001].
service, social services, education, the police, and local government. Besides, they were be-
coming a threat to the effectiveness of the armed forces as well as to individual freedom.
Despite the sharp increase in red tape, by mid-2001 Britain was still regarded as hav-
ing a more business-friendly environment than other European Union countries.
Nevertheless, since 1997 its global competitiveness has been gradually falling. There have
been troubles with targets, too, arising from their impact on the behaviour of individuals
and organisations: targets may encourage cheating and rule-breaking, adversely affect per-
formance in areas not covered by them, and reduce responsiveness to real problems.14
A number of factors have contributed to the proliferation of rules and targets. They
have included the government’s goal-orientation; its naive belief in the inherent effective-
ness of rules and targets and, hence, of centralisation and micromanagement; its petty risk-
aversion manifesting itself in, inter alia, its safety fanaticism; and the influence of regula-
tion-demanding pressure groups and public opinion.
Between Leviathan and anarchy
The probability that goal-orientated state regulation will fail to attain its objectives and/or
produce unintended consequences increases the more extensive and intensive it is. This
means that there are limits to effective state regulation, to political control over the econ-
omy and society. Yet, even when state regulation fails to attain its objectives and/or pro-
duces unintended consequences, it still can be effective enough to keep anarchy (in the
sense of a state of disorder)15 at bay and to maintain a system of ordered relationships.
Situations can arise, though, when effective state regulation is practically absent either
because government is unable and/or unwilling to enforce the enacted formal rules, or be-
cause the collapse of the hitherto established political and economic system has created a
temporary systemic vacuum. Predictably, such situations tend to bring about an increase in
self-regulation as well as an expansion of both the household economy and the second econ-
omy, and urgently call for effective (not just nominal) state regulation, for the rule of law.
In the last decade of the twentieth century, a tempory systemic vacuum came into
being in the former Soviet-bloc countries as a result of the collapse of communism there-
in. As already noted, the communist systems established in these countries were charac-
terised by a state regulation that was highly restrictive in all spheres of human behaviour
and human social interaction. Yet, they did not escape non-compliance (albeit mostly
covert) in the form of, inter alia, productive second economy activity, corruption, patron-
age, and informal networks.16
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14/ To give an example, the performance targets set by the Strategic Rail Authority have encouraged
train operators to stretch journey times in their timetables to minimize the risk of trains arriving late,
so that some journeys now take longer than they did 100 years ago. [The Economist, 9 June 2001, p. 47.]
15/ In the parlance of libertarianism and anarchism, though, the term ‘anarchy’ is merely another name
for spontaneity. The former argues that the role of the state should be confined to the protection of in-
dividual liberty and private property, while the latter advocates the abolition of the state and its re-
placement by a free and spontaneous cooperation among individuals, groups, regions, and nations.
16/ Patronage and informal networks in the party-state are the subject-matter of a special issue of
[Contemporary European History, 2002). See also Alena V. Ledeneva [1998].
Basically, the temporary systemic vacuum brought about by the collapse of commu-
nism meant an anarchic situation in which the hitherto established system of state regu-
lation was not functioning any more, but an alternative system of state regulation still was
not in place. Consequently, it was far from clear which government-made formal rules
were in force, and this uncertainty inevitably had an adverse impact on both rule-enforce-
ment and law-abidance. Thus, one of the problems facing the post-communist countries
right from the beginning was to build an effective system of state regulation that would put
an end to the existing systemic vacuum and ensure stability.
Since state regulation is a question of the scope of political power and the role of the
state in the economy and society, the problem was to define both. And since effective state
regulation is not possible without rule-makers and rule-enforcers, the problem implied
defining the structure of political power as well. In sum, the problem was to define formal
rules governing the behaviour of and interaction between social actors in post-communist
societies, including the acquisition, exercise, and accountability of political power, revenue
extraction and spending by government, the allocation of resources and tasks, and the dis-
tribution of outcomes.
Not surprisingly, in practice some post-communist countries have dealt with this
problem more successfully than others. That is to say, while some already have built an ef-
fective system of state regulation compatible with democracy and market capitalism, oth-
ers have failed to do so hitherto.17 Among the latter, the most prominent stragglers have
been Russia,18 Ukraine, and Belarus, as well as Bulgaria and Romania.
A number of intrasocietal (country-specific) and extrasocietal factors have encour-
aged or retarded the building of an effective post-communist system of state regulation and
affected the extent and intensity of state regulation. To name a few, the former have in-
cluded post-communist governments’ determination, orientation, policies, and capabili-
ties, the party and electoral systems, the influence of pressure groups and social move-
ments, the values of society, voters’ manifested preferences, and the mood of the time,
while the latter have included, at least in the case of the applicants for membership in the
European Union (EU), the EU’s requirement that the applicants implement a prior wide-
ranging harmonisation of their legal standards and institutions with those prevailing in
the EU.
Even when the post-communist countries have succeeded in building an effec-
tive system of state regulation, though, they have not been able completely to elimi-
nate non-compliance with government-made formal rules. Consequently, they have not
been able to get rid of informal economy activity (fraud, tax evasion, corruption, organ-
ised crime,19 and so on) either. However, its extent has varied considerably from one 
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17/ See e.g. Adrian Karatnycky [1997].
18/ In post-communist Russia, for instance, ‘The problem is not an absence of legislation, but an ab-
sence of enforcement and an associated absence of expectations for the rule of law to be established
in the near future’ [Stefan Hedlund, 1999, 261].
19/ The bearers of organized crime are known as mafias. Two types of mafia organisations may be
distinguished, namely, the mafia as a profit-maximising firm and the mafia as a government. The lat-
ter plays a rule-making role in a given territory, be it geographically or functionally defined, and im-
poses regulations on legal and/or illegal firms. Thus, it provides a rule of law of a sort and a system
of dispute settlement, i.e. a relatively stable framework for economic activity.
post-communist country to another and, within the same post-communist country, over
time.20
While it is likely that in the post-communist countries the extent of informal econo-
my activity will contract somewhat in the future, it is unlikely that they will see this mar-
keted albeit illegal and unrecorded economic activity to disappear totally. After all, the in-
formal economy is a universal feature of modern (state) societies as well as a cross-system
phenomenon.
Conclusion
Whether they are traditional or modern, societies need regulation of human behaviour and
human social interaction if they want to maintain a system of ordered relationships and,
thus, to survive and prosper. Hence, regulation matters. More specifically, it matters who
regulates what, when, how, and why on the basis of what title, at what costs, and with what
consequences.
In modern societies, one of the rule-makers and rule-enforcers is the state. This rais-
es the important question of its role in the economy and society at large, because the role
it actually plays in the economy and society has an impact on the degree of autonomy
(freedom) enjoyed by the members of society and, at the same time, is a source of tensions
and conflicts in society. These tensions and conflicts arise from differences in social ac-
tors’ interests. Social actors, be they individuals or social systems, are motivated first and
foremost by their own interests, and their pursuit of self-interest then determines their at-
titudes towards the role of the state in the economy and society at large and, thus, towards
the extent and intensity of state regulation. And since social actors’ interests differ, also
their attitudes towards the extent and intensity of state regulation differ.
As a result of these tensions and conflicts, the extent and intensity of state regula-
tion undergo change over time. In fact, over the last five centuries modern societies have
experienced regulation-deregulation cycles, with regulation-orientated periods (charac-
terised by governments obsessed with regulation) followed by spontaneity-orientated peri-
ods (characterised by governments showing regulatory restraint) and spontaneity-orien-
tated periods giving way to regulation-orientated periods.
While temporary fluctuations in the extent and intensity of state regulation tend to be
triggered off by contingencies such as war or natural disasters, regulation-deregulation cycles
reflect mood swings (change in preferences) brought about by social actors’ perception of a
widening gap between their expectations and reality. Regulation-orientated periods begin to
come to their end when the enforcement costs of state regulation begin to exceed its bene-
fits, when state regulation begins to fail to attain its objectives, and when non-compliance be-
gins to be common rather than rare. In contrast, spontaneity-orientated periods begin to
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20/ On the size of the second economy in the post-communist countries between 1989 and 1995 see
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [Transition Report 1997, p. 74, and Mária
Lackó, 2000, 117-149]. On the level of corruption in selected post-communist countries see [Richard
Rose, William Mishler and Christian Haerpfer, 1998, 221, Table 10.1], and on the level of corrup-
tion in developed, developing, and post-communist countries see Vito Tanzi [1998, 559-594].
come to their end when state regulation begins to be regarded widely as a panacea and when
security (protection against any contingency) begins to be valued more than freedom.
Neither regulation-orientation nor spontaneity-orientation is peculiar to a particular
type of modern political system. That is to say, the extent and intensity of state regulation
do not depend on whether the established political system is authoritarian or democratic.
Both can be either restrictive or permissive, albeit with the proviso that authoritarian po-
litical systems are by their nature always restrictive in the political sphere.
Although the extent and intensity of state regulation can give rise to tensions and
conflicts in any type of modern political systems, in democratic political systems they can
also give rise to a tension between democratic procedures of governance and goal-attain-
ment. The reason is that in these systems the goal-orientation of the elected government
can lead to the subordination of democratic procedures of governance to goal-attainment,
to an authoritarian, stealthy, or control-freak style of governance which does not hesitate
to discard those democratic procedures of governance that inhibit goal-attainment.
In contemporary societies, not surprisingly, state regulation continues to play an im-
portant role in all spheres of human behaviour and human social interaction. Yet, and
again not surprisingly, governments are not monopoly rule-makers and rule-enforcers.
Whether elected or not, they inevitably have to compete with a wide range of other rule-
makers and rule-enforcers, intrasocietal as well as extrasocietal, who act as constraints on
their rule-making and rule-enforcement.
Both permissive and restrictive state regulation continue to have their ardent propo-
nents and opponents, with the proponents of state regulation demanding more state regu-
lation and the opponents of state regulation demanding less state regulation. However, since
about the mid-1990s demands for more state regulation, for activist government, have been
growing, partly as a response to economic liberalisation and globalisation.21 In other words,
belief in the inherently beneficial effects of state regulation remains widespread in many so-
cieties.22 At the same time, most governments still have a penchant for incessant meddling,
tinkering, and regulative activity, and an aversion to spontaneity and, thus, to deregulation.
Yet there are compelling reasons for encouraging spontaneity, i.e. individual free-
dom and self-regulation, albeit within a stable framework of general ex ante rules. Modern
societies are complex systems. Moreover, the world is currently undergoing rapid, wide-
ranging, and pronounced change, which creates problems calling for a solution. But dif-
ferent social actors face in different circumstances different problems which need tailored
solutions. Therefore, problems should be solved at the level at which they arise by those
who experience them and have an interest in their effective and efficient solution as well
as the requisite knowledge and capabilities.
Since extensive and intensive state regulation stifles spontaneity, it inevitably retards
societal development, both economic and non-economic. On top of that, it can fail to at-
tain its objectives and/or produce unintended consequences, one of them being covert and
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21/ Globalism’s challengers are discussed by Manfred B. Steger [2002], who makes a distinction be-
tween left and right anti-globalists.
22/ According to Kate Hudson [2000, 16], ‘the new, post-1989, anti-welfare face of capitalism is far
from being welcome to a very large part of the population’. On contemporary economic anti-liber-
alism see David Henderson [2001].
overt non-compliance with government-made formal rules. Expressed differently, it can fail
to solve existing problems, exacerbate them, and/or create new ones.
At the same time, state regulation takes place in a world which is interdependent,
made up of nation-states pursuing their own interests, and differentiated in economic, po-
litical, social, and cultural terms. This diversity of national interests and conditions con-
stitutes a constraint on the extent and intensity of effective supranational (regional and
global) regulation, even in the case of the European Union with its superstate tendency.
Just as individual societies, the world too is characterised by a web of formal and informal
regulation and self-regulation, by a plurality of regulatory systems.
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